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                               This paper builds a  closed-economy NK-DSGE model with no capital, in 
which consumers value both private and public consumption and fiscal policy 
is determined by a feedback rule responding to output gap. We analyse how 
different degrees of substitutatibility/complementarity between private and 
public consumption and a pro/counter-cyclical stance of fiscal policy affect 
equilibrium determinacy and the response of the model economy to a wide 
range of shocks. Results show that determinacy is ensured by counter-cyclical 
fiscal policy under complementarity; increasing substitutability also pro-
cyclical stance becomes stable. Differences can be observed also in response to 
shocks. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper belongs to the literature on equilibrium determinacy and response to shocks in New 
Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium models. The two features we inserted in order to 
enrich the standard framework have to do with the nature of the relationship between government 
expenditure and private consumption, and with the pro/counter cyclical attitude of the former. 
Regarding the first issue, the question of whether private and public consumption are complements or 
substitutes has been studied by a large literature (Aschauer 1985, Campbell and Mankiw 1990, Graham 
and Himarios 1991, Graham 1993, Karras 1994, Ni 1995, Amano and Wirjanto 1998, Okubo 2003), 
with mixed evidence, slightly in favour of complementarity. Fiorito and Kollintzas (2004) operate a 
distinction among different categories of public expenditure, concluding that while public goods seems 
to substitute private consumption, merit goods tend to be featured by complementarity. In time, the 
issue has come to play a relevant role for the functioning of theoretical and empirical DSGE models 
who became the main tool for policy analysis in macroeconomics (Christiano and Eichenbaum 1992, 
Baxter and King 1993, Deveraux et al. 1996). In this paper, we construct a Constant-Elasticity of 
Substitution (CES) basket between private and public consumption, inside a Constant-Relative-Risk-
Advesion (CRRA) functional form; complementarity or substitutability arise according to a given 
relationship between the corresponding structural parameters, namely the elasticity of substitution and 
the risk adversion coefficient. In doing so, we choose the useful government expenditure approach (in 
line with contributions such as Garelli 2001, Bouakez, Rebei 2003, Gali, Monacelli 2005), which is one 
the three main approaches that are being used in order to break the Ricardian and so attempt to replicate 
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with general equilibrium models the main empirical regularities concerning government variables.3 
The other issue at the heart of this paper's analysis is the relative desiderability of pro/counter cyclical 
fiscal policy. We do not perform any welfare analysis, but we only examine the different responses of 
the model economy (in terms of determinacy and response to shocks) to the sign of the feedback rule 
linking government expenditure to output gap. A widespread consensus has been achieved on the 
beneficial effects of counter-cyclical fiscal policy, as it provides stabilization over the business cycle, 
enables the economy to effectively fight recessions without damaging public finance equilibrium, and it 
is consistent with optimal tax-smoothing (Barro1979). However the policy debate is still struggling to 
fully internalize this prescription and to conceive effective institutional arrangements to successfully 
implement it; one of the main criticisms made to the Stability and Growth Pact concerns the 
insufficient effort it produces in order to avoid asymmetry and procyclical bias in the conduct of 
national fiscal policies. Many observers pointed out that the Pact does not entirely ensure fiscal 
consolidation during good times and induces pro-cyclical adjustments during an economic downturn 
or, at least, it does not seem to do the job in a symmetric way. Accusation of tendency to procylicality 
is made by Coricelli and Ercolani (2002) and confirmed by Orbàn and Szapàrt (2004), and also by 
Balassone, Monacelli (2000) and Buti, Eijffinger,Franco (2003). Although the above example would 
better be addressed by an optimal taxation analysis in open economy, here we rather focus on showing 
the effects of pro/counter cyclical fiscal rules in a closed economy framework, in which the way public 
expenditure interacts with private consumption is more adequately taken into account. 
 
 
                                                 
3The other two approaches are finite-horizon (or overlapping generations) models and the rule of thumb (or credit 
constrained) agents models. 
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The main scope of this paper is to assess if and how the determinacy of the rational expectations 
equilibrium and the response to technological, fiscal and cost-push shocks are affected by the different 
degrees of complementarity/substitutability between private and public consumption and of pro/counter 
cyclicality of fiscal policy. We do so by building a closed economy NK-DSGE with no capital which 
incorporates the two above novelties. The main conclusion is that the two above aspects cannot really 
be separated, as one can relevantly affect the other. In fact, effects on the economy of a pro/counter 
cyclical fiscal stance can be depending on the way public consumption interacts with government 
expenditure. Indeed, the latter creates a good-market effect (a movement in private expenditure) and a 
labour-market effect (a movement in the wedge between marginal utility of consumption and marginal 
disutility of working), and both depend on the nature of the relationship between private and public 
consumption. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the theoretical set up, section 3 deals with the 
resulting system of equations in which the economy collapses and the calibration; section 4 is 
concerned with stability analysis, section 5 with impulse responses. Section 6 concludes and discusses 
possible extensions. 
 
2. The model 
2.1 Households and aggregate demand 
The economy is composed of a continuum of infinitely-lived individuals, whose measure is normalized 
to unity. Each of them consumes a consumption basket  C̃t  and supplies labour  Nt  to a continuum of 
monopolistically-competitive intermediate firms. Wealth is allocated into one-period bonds  Bt . 
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The instantaneous utility function amounts to be: 
 
                                                     
Ut  C̃t
1−
1− −
an
1n Nt
1n
                                                     (1) 
 
where the consumption basket is a mix of public and private consumption: 
 
                                                 
C̃t  Ct
−1
v  1−Gt
v−1
v
v
v−1
                                                 (2) 
 
The representative household choose a pattern for  Cti,Nti,
Bti
Pti i0

  
to solve: 
 
                                                                
maxEt∑
i0

iUti
                                                              (3) 
 
 
It is important to note that the representative household does not choose  Gt  , but just use the quantity 
that the government provides in accordance to the fiscal policy rule (which governs public expenditure 
and not taxation). 
Households' budget constraint is: 
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Ct  WtPt Nt t −Tt −
Mt −Mt−1
Pt
−
1
it
Bt −Bt−1
Pt
 
                           (4) 
 
with: 
 t  = real-profits from the firms 
 Tt  = lump-sum taxes 
 it  = nominal interest rate 
 ,m,n     0  
 
Fisher-parity holds: 
 
                                                                     
Rt1  itEt PtPt1                                                      (5) 
 
with  Rt1  being the ex-post real interest rate. 
First order condition for consumption is: 
 
 
 
                  
Ct1
Ct
 EtRt1 C̃t1
C̃t
1−
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In the special case  v  1  (which, as it will become clear further below, corresponds to the case 
where public consumption has no effects on private consumption) we have the standard Euler equation. 
First order condition with respect to labour supply: 
 
                                                  
Ct−
1
 Ct
−1
v  1−Gt
v−1
v
−v1
v−1 Wt
Pt
 anNtn  
                           (6) 
 
Equation (6) makes clear the supply-side effects of fiscal policy: by entering the consumption basket, it 
creates a wedge between marginal disutility of labour supply and marginal utility of private 
consumption. The sign of the wedge is given by the structural parameters    and  v,   as it is clear from 
several points of views. Also here we can see that in the special case  v  1  we are back to the 
standard condition for optimality in the labour market. 
Loglinearizing the equation of optimal consumption: 
 
                                                              C̃t
1−
 Ct
− 1v  EtRt1 C̃t1
1−
v Ct1
− 1v
                                         (7) 
 
Brings to: 
 
                                                  ct  −rt1  1−c̃t − 1−Etc̃t1 Etct1                            (8) 
 
Loglinearizing (2) leads to: 
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c̃t   C
C̃
−1

ct  1− G
C̃
−1

gt
                                       (9) 
 
Plugging (9) and the same expression shifted one period forward into (8) I get: 
 
          
ct  − 
1− 1− C
C̃
−1

rt1 −
1−1− G
C̃
−1

1− 1− C
C̃
−1

Etgt1 −gtEtct1
  (10) 
 
(10) is the Euler equation for this case. 
 
Defining: 
 

1−1− C
C̃
−1

  
 
1−1− G
C̃
−1
1−1− C
C̃
−1
 
  
 
                                                         ct  −rt1 −Etgt1 −gtEtct1                                      (11) 
 
Log-linearized aggregate resource constraint leads to: 
 
                                                                        
yt  C̄Ȳct 
Ḡ
Ȳ
gt
                                                  (12) 
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and: 
 
                                                                 
Etct1  YCEtyt1 −
G
CEtgt1                                          (13) 
 
Rearranging: 
 
                                           
yt  −C̄Ȳrt1 Etyt1 
Ḡ C̄
Ȳ
gt −Etgt1  
                           (14) 
 
(14) is the IS curve of this economy. 
 
2.1.1. Relationship between private and public consumption 
 
The scope of this paper is to investigate how the standard framework changes when we take into 
account the different way public expenditure interacts with private consumption; we have already seen 
from first order conditions on labour supply and consumption the importance of the structural 
parameters    (risk adversion) and  v  (elasticity between  G  and  C  in the consumption basket). Let 
us now derive the formal conditions. 
Marginal utility of private consumption amounts to: 
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∂U
∂Ct  Ct
− 1 C̃t
− 1
                                                 (15) 
 
Loglinearizing and using the loglinearized basket (9): 
 
 C
C̃
− 1 C̃− − C
C̃
− 1 C̃− 1 − CC̃
− 1 11 − ct  CC̃
− 1 C̃−1 −1− GC̃
−1
 gt
  
 
Let us study the sign of the coefficient on  gt :  
 
sign C
C̃
− 1
C̃−1 −1− GC̃
−1
  sign 1 −
 
 
 
We see that if  1 −  0  then public consumption raises the marginal utility of private consumption, 
whereas the opposite occurs if  1 −  0  . So if   v  1   then  G  and  C  are complements, and if  
v  1   they are substitutes. So in the former case after an increase in public expenditure, two things 
occur: in the goods market, private consumption increases, because of complementarity; in the labour 
market, marginal utility of working one hour more (the LHS of (labour supply)) increases, and so 
labour supply increases. In the latter case, private consumption decreases, because of substitutability, 
and labour supply increases by a less extent. 
 
 
 11
2.2 Firms 
 
There are two kind of firms: final goods producers and intermediate goods producers. 
 
2.2.1. Final goods producers 
Final goods producers are perfectly competitive firms producing an homogeneous good  Yt  using 
intermediate goods, since there are a continuum of intermediate goods producers of measure unity, 
each producing a differentiated input for final goods production. Let  Ytf  being the input produced 
by intermediate goods firm  f   and  z  the types available; the production function that transforms 
intermediate goods into final output is: 
 
                                                           
Yt  
0
1
Yt
fz −1 dz

−1
                                                 (16) 
 
with      1  being the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods. We can see that this CES 
production function exhibits diminishing marginal product, a property that will drive the firms to 
diversify and produce all the intermediate goods available. 
The final good producer will minimize its cost; therefore it will choose  Yt
fz  to: 
 
                                                                
min
0
1
PtzYtfzdz
                                                     (17) 
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subject to the production function (production function). 
Total demand curve for intermediate good  z  is: 
Ytz  PtzPt
−
Yt
 
 
and aggregate price index: 
 
Pt  
0
1
Ptz 11− dz
1
1−
 
                                  
 
2.2.2. Intermediate goods producers 
 
Intermediate goods firms are monopolistically competitive and have the following standard constant-
return-to-scale production function: 
 
                                                                   Ytf  AtNt                                                      (18) 
 
with  At  being the technological parameter following a stationary AR(1) process of the form: 
 
         at  at−1 t  
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where  t  0,2.   
They set prices on a Calvo-Yun based staggered framework, with  1−  being the probability that 
each period the firm adjusts its price, and    being obviously the probability that it keeps prices 
constant. 
Intermediate firms maximize expected discounted profits subject to the production function (18) and 
the demand curve they face; in the flexible-prices equilibrium the maximization problem leads to the 
usual condition: 
 
                                                                        
MCt  11                                                 (19) 
 
with  1  1−  being the steady-state mark-up. 
With sticky prices, the relevant maximization problem for the firm becomes: 
 
max∑
i0
i
iEtt,i Ptf−MCti
n f
Pti
Yt,tif
 
 
with: 
 MCtnf  PtMCtf   nominal marginal cost 
 t,i  CtiCt
−  stochastic discount factor 
subject to (18). 
Optimal price results to be: 
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Pt∗  1∑
i0
i
t,iMCt1n
                                        (20) 
 
with: 
 t,i  ft,i,Yti  
that is, the optimal price equals the steady-state mark-up times a weighted average of expected future 
nominal marginal costs; the weights depend on how much the firm discounts future cash flows in each 
period  t  i  (taking into account that prices remain fixed along the way) and on the revenue expected 
in each period. 
Considering also that the aggregate price index is a combination of price charged by those firms who 
get to change their prices and those who do not: 
 
                                                            Pt  Pt
1−  1−Pt∗1−
1
1−
                                         (21) 
 
2.3. Potential output 
 
Let us start by looking for an equilibrium on the labour market. This has to imply that firms’ wage 
decisions based on cost minimization problem must be equal to the wage decision by households based 
on their optimizing behaviour. From the firms’ point of view we have the usual condition coming from 
cost minimization: 
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Wt
Pt
At
 MCt
                                                        (22) 
 
which, combined with the steady-state expression for marginal cost (19) becomes: 
 
                                                                              
Wt
Pt
 At1                                                         (23) 
 
Combining with households'optimal labour supply (6): 
 
                                                                      
At
1 
anNt
n
Ct−
1
 C̃t
− 1
                                                (24) 
 
using the production function (18), after few simple algebrical manipulations: 
 
                                                        Yt  At
1n
n an
− 1n 1− 1n C̃ −
1 
n  1n C −1vn                                 (25) 
 
which is, in level, the supply function of our economy under flexible prices. 
Solving for the steady-state mark-up: 
 
                                                             1  Yt
−nAt
n1C̃t
− 1 an−1C− 1v                                      (26) 
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Loglinearizing, and using expressions (9) and (12): 
 
t  n 1at  − 1v   C̄C̃
−1
 Ȳ
C̄
yt − ḠC̄gt  1−
Ḡ
C̃
−1

gt −nyt − 1v ȲC̄yt −
Ḡ
C̄
gt
 
                                                                                                                                                               (27) 
To find an expression for potential output let us set    0  (since at  Y∗  log-deviations from steady 
state mark up are equal to zero) and solve for  yt∗ :  
 
yt∗  n 1
− 1v  CC̃
−1
 Ȳ
C̄
 1v ȲC̄ n
at 
− 1v  CC̃
−1
 Ḡ
C̄
 − 1v 1− GC̃
−1
  1v ḠC̄
− 1v  CC̃
−1
 Ȳ
C̄
 1v ȲC̄ n
gt
                                                                                                                                                               (28) 
 
Equation (28) is the expression for potential output in log-deviations from the steady-state. We can 
justify the presence of  gt   with the wedge that public expenditure creates in the optimality condition 
for labour supply, as discussed before. 
 
2.4. New Keynesian Phillips Curve 
 
In order to get the New Keynesian Phillips curve, let us solve (28) for  at  and plug it back into 
(27);considering the loglinearization of the mark-up (19) : 
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                                                                          −mc                                                                     (29) 
 
 
we easily get to: 
                                             
mc  − 1v  C̄C̃
−1
 Ȳ
C̄
 1v ȲC̄ n yt −yt
∗  
                     (30) 
 
if we go back to the firm sector and plug the expression for optimal price  Pt
∗
 (20) into the aggregate 
price index (21), after some long but standard algebra and dropping all the terms involving a product of 
two or more variables in log-deviation from the steady-state4, we get to the standard formulation of the 
New Keynesian Phillips Curve: 
 
                                                        
t  1−1− mct Ett1                                    (31) 
 
Plugging (30): 
 
t  1−1− −
1
v  C̄C̃
−1
 Ȳ
C̄
 1v ȲC̄ n yt −yt
∗Ett1
 
                                                                                                                                                               (32) 
                                                 
4That is because we are not interested in second-order terms. 
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we see that also the derivation of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve is affected by the innovation 
introduced in the model; equation (32) in fact represents the more general case, which include the 
standard formulation as special case when there is no useful government expenditure. 
 
2.5 Monetary policy rule 
 
In line with most of the literature we assume a Taylor-like monetary policy rule for the evolution of the 
nominal interest rate with inertia: 
                                                                it  iit−1 t xyt −yt∗                                        (33) 
where obviously interest rate responds to movements in current inflation and current output gap. 
 
2.6. Fiscal policy rule 
 
We assume that government applies a counter-cyclical fiscal policy rule of the kind: 
 
                                                            
Gt
Ḡ
 YtYt∗
−
g Gt−1Ḡ t                                      (34) 
where    is the parameter determining the intensity of the counter-cyclicality of the fiscal policy rule,  
g   is the parameter measuring the inertia of government expenditure and  t   is a i.i.d. fiscal shock 
with zero mean and constant variance which captures all the deviations of government expenditure 
dynamics from the systematic part. Government operates under a balance-budget condition with no 
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debt, collecting the amount of resources it needs every period by using lum-sum taxation. 
Loglinearization of (34) leads to: 
                                                              gt  −yt −yt
∗ggt−1 t                                           (35) 
 
3. The system of equations 
The economy is described by the system of equations (14),(28),(32),(33),(35) 
Defining the parameters: 
 
 
n1
− 1v  C̄C̃
−1 Ȳ
C̄
 1v ȲC̄n
 b1
  
 
− 1v  C̄C̃
−1 Ḡ
C̄
− 1v 1− ḠC̃
−1  1v ḠC̄
− 1v  C̄C̃
−1 Ȳ
C̄
 1v ȲC̄n
 b2
  
 
1−1−
           
 
− 1v  C̄C̃
−1
 Ȳ
C̄
 1v ȲC̄ n             
   k  
 
C̄
Ȳ
  C̄
Ȳ

1−1− C
C̃
−1
 c1
  
 
ḠC̄
Ȳ
 Ḡ
Ȳ
 C̄
Ȳ
1−1− Ḡ
C̃
−1
1−1− C̄
C̃
−1
 c2
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Then the system is: 
 
yt∗  b1at b2gt
t  kyt −yt∗Ett1
it  t xyt −yt∗
yt  −c1it −Ett1Etyt1 c2gt −Etgt1
gt  −yt −yt∗ggt−1 t
at  at−1 t  
 
plus the equation defining the output gap as actual minus potential output. System in matrix form can 
be found in the Appendix. 
Table 1 here shows the baseline calibration: 
 
TABLE1HERE  
 
As made clear in section 1, the degree of complementarity / substitutability between public and private 
consumption depends on the relationship between the elasticity of substitution between private and 
public consumption ( v ), and the inverse of risk adversion coefficient ( 
1  )5 Whenever  v      1   we 
have complementarity, in the opposite case we have substitutability, whereas if they are equal we are in 
the benchmark case were there is no relationship between  C  and  G.   In the following two sections 
we will be varying the parameter  v  above and below the threshold  
1   so to check the model's 
                                                 
5Note that the ratio  
1
v   is, in standard frameworks, the intertemporal elasticity of consumption. In our more general 
framework, however, this measure is modified by the presence of government expenditure in the utility function and it is no 
longer the inverse of the risk adversion coefficient. 
 
 21
behaviour.6 In particular, in section 4 we will see which range of fiscal policy parameter    is 
consistent with determinacy of the equilibrium, for different monetary policy stances (aggressive, 
standard, and passive). In section 5 we will see how the regime of complementarity or substitutability 
interacts with different degrees of pro/counter cyclicality of the fiscal rule (for given, standard, 
monetary policy stance) in responding to a wide set of shocks hitting the economy. 
 
4. Stability analysis 
 In the following experiments, we vary  v  above and below  
1 ,   varying also the monetary policy 
stance (modifying the coefficient on inflation    ). The first three case in both the following tables 
depicts the benchmark case (i.e. no relationship between private and public consumption), whereas the 
following two triples show us what happens increasing in two steps the degree of, respectively, 
complementarity and substitutability between private and public consumption. The last column 
indicates the range of the fiscal policy parameter    consistent with equilbrium determinacy; given the 
fiscal rule (35),    0  corresponds to counter-cyclical fiscal policy, while    0  to pro-cyclical. 
 
TABLE2HERE  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
 
6As we vary  v  , we will remember to vary accordingly also the ratios of private and public consumption over the basket, 
since they are function of structural parameters    and   . 
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Increasing complementarity does not seem to modify the Taylor principle: no matter the degree of 
complementarity, the coefficient on inflation still needs to be greater than one for the equilibrium to be 
determined. We also do not find any (significant) changes with respect to benchmark as we increase 
complementarity; in all cases determinacy of the equilibrium is given by all range of    leading to 
counter-cyclicality (and a small range of pro-cyclicality). 
 
 Table 3 show us the results as we induce and increase substitutability. 
 
TABLE3HERE  
 
Also in this case Taylor principle is confirmed, no matter how substitute  C  and  G  are. Furthermore, 
we note that increasing the degree of substitutability makes pro-cyclical fiscal policy also determinate, 
for an increasing range of pro-cyclical parameters of the fiscal policy rule; equivalently, increasing 
complementarity (=decreasing substitutability) makes only counter-cyclical regime consistent with 
determinacy. 
The main conclusion we can draw is that increasing the substitutability between public and private 
consumption allows for stability of pro-cyclical fiscal policy, in addition to counter-cyclical, which is 
the only stability rule in case of complementarity. The intuition behind this result is that if government 
expenditure is pro-cyclical, namely it is directly proportional to the dynamics of actual output, the 
inflationary pressure is dumped by the optimizing behaviour of consumers, who endogenously decrease 
private consumption in response to an increase in public consumption, because of the presence of 
complementarity in the utility function. 
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5. Response to shocks 
 
This section shows the response of output gap and public expenditure to three types of stochastic 
shocks: technological, fiscal and cost-push shock. Autoregressive parameters are calibrated as in Table 
1 in section 3. All results are derived for a given monetary policy (   1.5 ). Since in most cases 
differences are hard to notice in a graph, quantitative simulations on variables'initial reactions can be 
found in Appendix A. 
 
5.1 Technological shock 
Let us start from showing the benchmark case, in which the risk adversion coefficient (  )is set at 0.5 
and the elasticity of substitution between private and public consumption ( v ) is set at 2. So we are 
back to the standard case where public consumption does not affect the consumption basket in the 
utility function. Here are the results, for different values of the fiscal policy pararamer   :  
                                                              
FIGURE1HERE  
 
 
The upper panel shows the counter-cyclical case, for different degrees of intensity    0.5,1,1.5 , 
whereas the lower panel shows the pro-cyclical case.  More complete quantitative simulations can 
found in appendix. 
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In the counter-cyclical case, this is the mechanism at work. Technological shock has a positive effect 
on both actual and potential output, but the latter is stronger so the overall effect on output gap is 
negative. At this point, three effects start working: decrease in the interest rate (through Taylor rule) 
which pushes up actual output, decrease in inflation (through Phillips curve) which also puts downward 
pressure on interest rate, and increase in government expenditure due to the counter-cyclical stance of 
the fiscal policy rule;so the three effects push in the same upward direction of closing the output gap by 
raising actual output. The more counter-cyclical fiscal policy is, the stronger the third effect, and so the 
lower is the initial (negative) response of output gap, the higher the initial (positive) response of 
government expenditure, the quicker the re-absorption of output gap. 
In the pro-ciclical case, the third effect works in the opposite direction, since now public expenditure 
follows the negative trend of the output gap induced by the technological shock. The negative effect on 
output gap is thus more and more severe as the degree of prociclicality increases; at the same time, the 
worsening of the output gap strenghtens the standard responses of the inflation/interest rate channels, 
so output gap overshoots before going back to the steady state (the extent of the overshooting increases 
with the degree of pro-ciclicality; in that case, obviously, return to the steady state is more rapid). For 
the same reason, initial response of government expenditure is more severe the more pro-cyclical fiscal 
policy is. 
This is the basic mechanism at work in the benchmark case, where public consumption does not affect 
private consumption. Let us see how introducing complementarity/substitutability affects the situation. 
The two following figures represent the complementarity case, obtained by lowering the elasticity of 
substitution  v  to  1.5  (figure 1) and then, widening the degree of complementarity, by bringing  v  to  
0.9 . (figure 2) 
 
 25
FIGURE2HERE  
 
 
FIGURE3HERE  
 
 
As we can see from the graphs (and from the tables) the effects are quantitatively quite small, but still 
they can give us interesting insights on how the behaviour of economic variables can change if the 
relationship between private and public consumption changes significantly. As we increase 
complementarity, the impact of technological shock on potential output is smaller, because of the 
supply-side effect of complementarity; at the same time, the relative effect on output gap is bigger, and 
this means that under counter-cyclical fiscal policy government expenditure increases more, whereas 
under pro-cyclical regime it decreases more and more as we increase the degree of complementarity. 
 
The opposite happens if we induce substitutabilty between private and public consumption by raising 
the elasticity of substitution    to  4  (figure 3) and then to  9  (figure 4) :  
 
                                                                         
FIGURE4HERE
FIGURE5HERE  
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We can see that output gap decreases less, and so public expenditure has a smaller increase in the 
counterciclical case and a smaller decrease in the prociclical case. 
 
5.2. Government expenditure shocks 
This section analyses what happens in case of shocks to the fiscal policy rule (the i.i.d term  t  ), a 
stochastic movement of government expenditure so to capture all the deviations from rationality that 
policy-makers might be induced to, due for example to political or lobbying pressures. 
Here are the results in the benchmark, where public consumption has not effect in households' utility 
function: 
 
                                                                          
 
FIGURE6HERE  
 
 
 
A fiscal shock generates an unexpected rise in public expenditure; in this model, this increases actual 
output (by increasing aggregate demand) and potential output (through the labour supply-channel), 
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with the former effect being much larger than the latter. Therefore output gap increases, and under 
counterciclical regime public expenditure decreases, bringing it back to equilibrium.  In the pro-
cyclical case, public expenditure increases by a much larger extent, since now the feedback rule 
reinforce the initial increase caused by the shock; as fiscal policy becomes more pro-cyclical, the 
positive effect on actual output offset the interest-rate and the inflation channels (who pushes towards 
closing of the output gap), and we observe an overshooting of the output gap itself, whose absorption is 
anyway quicker the more prociclical fiscal policy is. 
 
Let us see what happens as we introduce complementarity between private consumption and public 
expenditure, first in a week form (figure 6) and then in a stronger one (figure 7). 
 
 
FIGURE7HERE
FIGURE8HERE  
 
Introducing complementarity enhances the response of actual output (because of the parallel increase in 
private consumption) and potential output (because of the labour market effect), and the relative 
magnitude of these two effects is such that output gap's positive response is also enhanced. Under 
counter-cyclical fiscal policy, this dumpens public expenditure initial increase, whereas under 
prociclical regime initial response of public expenditure is increases, and this in turns widens the 
fluctuations of the output gap dynamics around equilibrium, that have seen to be typical of the pro-
cyclical stance. 
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What happens in case of substitutability? 
Intuitively, output will react less, since the innovation in public expenditure is now matched by a 
decrease in private consumption, which in turn dumpens the reaction of both actual output (because 
private consumption decreases) and potential output (since the wedge between marginal utility of 
consumption and marginal disutility of labour is now reduced). This will also be reflected in a 
smoother jump of public expenditure as we increase the absolute value of   , both under prociclical 
and counterciclical regime. These the results for  v  4  and then for  v  9 : 
                                                                         
 
FIGURE9HERE
FIGURE10HERE  
 
 
5.3. Cost push shock 
 
Let us see what is the model's reaction to an exogenous i.i.d.shock to the Phillips curve, mimicking all 
variations in real marginal costs that are due to factors other than excess demand (oil shocks, but also 
some forms of labour market power,etc). 
Here are the results in the benchmark case: 
 
FIGURE11HERE  
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Increasing the degree of counter-cyclicality increases the initial response of public expenditure, 
because the feedback response to the arising of the negative output gap (due to the cost push shock) is 
amplified; for the same reason, the more counter-cyclical fiscal policy is the less negative is the initial 
impact of the shock on output gap. 
In the pro-cyclical case the fiscal feedback rule further increase the negative response of output gap to 
the cost push shock, with an extent obviously increasing with the level of procyclicality. But as we 
increase it, the output gap response becomes so severe that the usual channels (interest rate and 
inflation) forces becomes stronger, and provoke and overshooting (similar, but of opposite sign, to the 
one observed in the fiscal shock case) which can be quite evident when the fiscal policy coefficient is  
1.5.   
With complementarity, in the counter-cyclical case the positive response of public expenditure is now 
coupled with a parallel increase in private consumption which, increasing output, makes output gap 
response less severe as we increase the degree of complementarity. In the pro-cyclical case, the 
opposite happens, and this widens the fluctuations of output gap around equilibrium. 
 
FIGURE12HERE  
 
 
FIGURE13HERE  
 
With substitutability,the response of private consumption (and thus of actual output) is opposite to the 
public expenditure movements induced by the arising of the negative output gap; this induces output 
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gap dynamics to be more ambiguous depending on the prevailing effect. 
 
FIGURE14HERE  
 
 
FIGURE15HERE  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This paper is concerned with a more accurate analysis on the effects of the fiscal policy regime when 
the relationship between private and public consumption is taken into account in a more detailed way. 
We presented a New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model in which households 
value both private and public consumption, and in which the latter is governed by a fiscal rule showing 
pro/counter cyclical stance according to the reaction to output gap movements. Our results can be 
summarized as follows. 
As far as stability properties are concerned, the model delivers determinacy of rational expectation 
equilibrium mainly for parameters showing counter-cyclicality of fiscal policy rule. However, as we 
increase the degree of substitutability between private and public consumption, we observe a widening 
of the range of parameters leading to determinacy, so that also pro-cyclical stance is stable. 
We also examined the reaction of the economy to a wide set of stochastic shocks (productivity, fiscal 
and cost-push). Generally speaking, pro-cyclical stance leads to the emergence of an overshooting 
reaction of output gap dynamics whose fluctuations are increasing with the degree of pro-cyclicality; as 
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far as public expenditure, its negative reaction is lower in case of productivity shock, it increases more 
in case of fiscal shock, and it decreases more in case of cost-push shock. A general feature of pro-
cyclical cases is that shocks are re-absorbed rather quickly. On the other hand, counter-cyclical stance 
leads to a well-behaved and more persistent response of economic variables. The more counter-
cyclical, the smaller the negative effect on output gap of productivity and cost-push shock but the 
smaller the positive effect of fiscal shock. Moreover, increasing counter-cyclicality leads to bigger 
positive response of public expenditure to productivity and cost-push shock, and to a dampening of the 
fiscal shock. Generally speaking, increasing complementarity between private and public consumption 
increases the absolute values of the above movements, whereas substitutability reduces them. 
 
The main result of this paper is that it really seems to make little sense to discuss pro-cyclicality or 
counter-cyclicality of fiscal policy without distinguish between the different categories of the 
government expenditure and their properties.For example, according to our simplified framework 
government expenditure on a public good (which can maybe be considered complementary to private 
consumption) is consistent with counter-cyclical fiscal policy and amplifies the response of output to 
shocks and their persistance; on the other hand, financing a merit good (which seems to be featured by 
substitutability) delivers stability under a prociclical stance but leads to overshooting dynamics for 
output gap but quicker re-absorptions. This remark obviously call for a more conclusive investigation 
of the properties of the different public expenditure's categories and the way they affect private 
consumption dynamics, an issue that, as shown in the introduction, has not yet found a clear solution in 
the literature. 
Future extensions on the theoretical side include addressing some of the shortcomings of the present 
framework, before turning to a possible open-economy model in which to better analyse some of the 
issues discussed in the introduction. For example, a more detailed analysis is needed not only on the 
 32
way public expenditure interacts with private consumption (distinguishing across different types of 
expenditure), but also on the way it is financed. An extended model should include distorsionary 
taxation (possibly on multiple sources, as in Forni, Monteforte, Sessa 2006) and debt emission. With 
such modifications, maybe some interesting conclusions on the macroeconomic consequences of fiscal 
policy could been drawn in a more adequate way. 
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FIGURES AND TABLES 
 
Figure 1: response to technological shock in the benchmark  
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Figure 2: response to technological shock with complementarity 
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Figure 3: response to technological shock with more complementarity 
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Figure 4: response to technological shock with substitutability 
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Figure 5: response to technological shock with more substitutability 
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Figure 6: response to fiscal shock in the benchmark 
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Figure 7: response to fiscal shock with complementarity 
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Figure 8: response to fiscal shock with more complementarity 
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Figure 9: response to fiscal shock with substitutability 
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Figure 10: response to fiscal shock with more substitutability 
0 20 40
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
alfa=0.5
0 20 40
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
alfa=1
0 20 40
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
alfa=1.5
0 20 40
-1
0
1
2
3
alfa=-0.5
0 20 40
-1
0
1
2
3
alfa=-1
0 20 40
-1
0
1
2
3
alfa=-1.5
Y-Y*
G
 
 
 40
 
 
Figure 11: response to cost-push shock in the benchmark 
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Figure 12: response to cost-push shock with complementarity 
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Figure 13: response to cost-push shock with more complementarity 
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Figure 14: response to cost-push shock with substitutability 
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Figure 15: response to cost-push shock with more substitutability 
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Table 1: baseline calibration 
Parameter Value Description 
β 0,99 subjective discount factor 
ζ 0,75 prob.of keeping prices fixed in a given period 
θ 0,75 preference parameter (weight in the CES) 
γ 0,75 risk adversion coefficient 
γ(n) 1,50 inverse of labour supply elasticity 
v 2 elasticity of substitution between priv. cons. and gov.expend. 
G/Y 0,25 ratio between gov.expend. and output in steady state 
C/Y 0,75 ratio between priv.expend and output in steady state 
φ(x) 0,5 output coefficient in Taylor rule 
ρ 0,95 AR(1) parameter of technological shock 
ρ(g) 0,9 AR(1) parameter of the fiscal shock 
φ(i)  0,5 interest rate inertia in Taylor rule 
 
 
Table 2: equilibrium determinacy increasing complementarity  
γ v φ(π) 
stability parameter for fiscal 
rule 
0,5 2 1,5   -1  <  α   < 3 
0,5 2 2,5   -1  <  α   < 3 
0,5 2 0,7 none 
    
0,5 1,5 1,5   -1  <  α   < 3 
0,5 1,5 2,5   -1  <  α   < 3 
0,5 1,5 0,7 none 
    
0,5 0,9 1,5   -1  <  α   < 3 
0,5 0,9 2,5   -1  <  α   < 3 
0,5 0,9 0,7 none 
 
 
Table 3: equilibrium determinacy increasing substitutability  
γ v φ(π) 
stability parameter for fiscal 
rule 
0,5 2 1,5   -1<  α   < 3 
0,5 2 2,5   -1 <  α   < 3 
0,5 2 0,7 no one 
    
0,5 4 1,5   -2  <  α   < 3 
0,5 4 2,5   -2  <  α   < 3 
0,5 4 0,7 no one 
    
0,5 9 1,5   -2.5  <  α   < 3 
0,5 9 2,5   -2,5<  α   < 3 
0,5 9 0,7 no one 
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Table A1: initial responses to technological shock 
  alfa=0.5 alfa=1 alfa=1.5  alfa=-0.5 alfa=-1 alfa=-1.5
BENCHMARK y-y* -0,4833 -0,3933 -0,3313  -0,8587 -1,184 -1,4452 
 g 0,2417 0,39333 0,4969  -0,4293 -1,184 -2,1679 
         
  alfa=0.5 alfa=1 alfa=1.5  alfa=-0.5 alfa=-1 alfa=-1.5
COMPL. y-y* -0,4864 -0,3953 -0,3327  -0,8686 -1,207 -1,5019 
 g 0,2432 0,3953 0,499  -0,4343 -1,207 -2,2528 
         
MORE 
COMPL.  alfa=0.5 alfa=1 alfa=1.5  alfa=-0.5 alfa=-1 alfa=-1.5
 y-y* -0,4923 -0,3993 -0,3355  -0,8871 -1,2554 -1,6656 
 g 0,2462 0,3993 0,5033  -0,4435 -1,2554 -2,4984 
         
  alfa=0.5 alfa=1 alfa=1.5  alfa=-0.5 alfa=-1 alfa=-1.5
SUBST. y-y* -0,4793 -0,3907 -0,3294  -0,8456 -1,1551 -1,3801 
 g 0,2396 0,3907 0,4941  0,4228 -1,1551 -2,0701 
         
  alfa=0.5 alfa=1 alfa=1.5  alfa=-0.5 alfa=-1 alfa=-1.5
MORE SUBST. y-y* -0,4776 -0,3895 -0,3286  -0,8402 -1,1432 -1,3548 
 g 0,2388 0,3895 0,4929  0,4201 -1,1432 -2,0322 
         
 
 
 
Table A2: initial response to fiscal shock 
  alfa=0.5 alfa=1 alfa=1.5  
alfa=-
0.5 alfa=-1 alfa=-1.5
BENCHMARK y-y* 0,4505 0,3695 0,3127  0,7528 0,898 0,8778 
 g 0,7747 0,6305 0,531  1,3764 1,898 2,3167 
         
  alfa=0.5 alfa=1 alfa=1.5  
alfa=-
0.5 alfa=-1 alfa=-1.5
COMPL. y-y* 0,4535 0,3715 0,314  0,7619 0,9189 0,9251 
 g 0,7733 0,6285 0,5289  1,381 1,9189 2,3877 
         
MORE 
COMPL.  alfa=0.5 alfa=1 alfa=1.5  
alfa=-
0.5 alfa=-1 alfa=-1.5
 y-y* 0,4587 0,375 0,3166  0,7771 0,9651 1,0714 
 g 0,7706 0,625 0,5252  1,3885 1,9651 2,6071 
         
  alfa=0.5 alfa=1 alfa=1.5  
alfa=-
0.5 alfa=-1 alfa=-1.5
SUBST. y-y* 0,4505 0,3695 0,3127  0,7528 0,898 0,8778 
 g 0,7747 0,6305 0,531  1,3764 1,898 2,3167 
         
 45
  alfa=0.5 alfa=1 alfa=1.5  
alfa=-
0.5 alfa=-1 alfa=-1.5
MORE 
SUBST. y-y* 0,4466 0,3669 0,3108  0,7407 0,8719 0,8243 
 g 0,7767 0,6331 0,5338  1,3703 1,8719 2,2362 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A3: initial responses to cost-push shock 
 
  alfa=0.5 alfa=1 alfa=1.5  
alfa=-
0.5 alfa=-1 alfa=-1.5
BENCHMARK y-y* -0,9439 -0,7681 -0,647  -1,677 -2,3124 -2,8226 
 g 0,472 0,7681 0,9704  
-
0,8385 -2,3124 -4,2338 
         
  alfa=0.5 alfa=1 alfa=1.5  
alfa=-
0.5 alfa=-1 alfa=-1.5
COMPL. y-y* -0,9112 -0,7406 -0,6233  
-
1,6274 -2,2612 -2,8137 
 g 0,4556 0,7406 0,935  
-
0,8137 -2,2612 -4,2206 
         
MORE 
COMPL.  alfa=0.5 alfa=1 alfa=1.5  
alfa=-
0.5 alfa=-1 alfa=-1.5
 y-y* -0,795 -0,6447 -0,5417  
-
1,4324 -2,0271 -2,6894 
 g 0,3975 0,6447 0,8126  
-
0,7162 -2,0271 -2,6894 
         
  alfa=0.5 alfa=1 alfa=1.5  
alfa=-
0.5 alfa=-1 alfa=-1.5
SUBST. y-y* -0,9802 -0,7989 -0,6736  
-
1,7293 -2,3622 -2,8222 
 g 0,4901 0,7989 1,0104  
-
0,8646 -2,3622 -4,2333 
         
  alfa=0.5 alfa=1 alfa=1.5  
alfa=-
0.5 alfa=-1 alfa=-1.5
MORE 
SUBST. y-y* -0,994 -0,8107 -0,6839  
-
1,7486 -2,3793 -2,8197 
 g 0,497 0,8107 1,0258  
-
0,8743 -2,3793 -4,2295 
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Appendix A: Quantitative results of impulse responses: initial 
impact 
 
 
TABLEA1HERE
TABLEA2HERE
TABLEA3HERE  
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Appendix B - the system in matrix form 
The system is in the form: 
 
AEtYt1  BYt CXt  
 
with the vector  Yt  being: 
 
Yt  yt,t,yt∗,xt,gt,it−1,at−1  
 
The system in a explicit form: 
 
Etyt1  C̄ȲEtt1 −
Ḡ C̄
Ȳ
Etgt1 − C̄Ȳit  yt −
Ḡ C̄
Ȳ
gt
Ett1  t −kxt −t
n 1
− 1v  CC̃
−1
 Ȳ
C̄
 1v ȲC̄ n
at  yt∗ −
− 1v  CC̃
−1
 Ḡ
C̄
 − 1v 1− GC̃
−1
  1v ḠC̄
− 1v  CC̃
−1
 Ȳ
C̄
 1v ȲC̄ n
0  gt xt −ght −t
at  at−1 t
it  iit−1 t xxt
0  xt −yt yt∗
ht1  gt
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In matrix form: 
 
1 C̄
Ȳ
 0 0 − ḠC̄
Ȳ
− C̄
Ȳ
 0 0
0  0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 n1
− 1v  CC̃
−1 Ȳ
C̄
 1v ȲC̄n
0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Et
yt1
t1
yt1∗
xt1
gt1
it
at
ht1

  
 
1 0 0 0 − ḠC̄
Ȳ
0 0 0
0 1 0 −k 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
− 1v  CC̃
−1 Ḡ
C̄
− 1v 1− GC̃
−1 − 1v ḠC̄
− 1v  CC̃
−1 Ȳ
C̄
 1v ȲC̄n
0 0 0
−1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0  1 0 0 −g
0  0 x 0 i 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
yt
t
yt∗
xt
gt
it−1
at−1
ht

0
0
0
0
−1
0
1
0
t
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
1−1− C
C̃
−1

  
 
1−1− G
C̃
−1
1−1− C
C̃
−1
 .
  
